Facebook Messenger Bug Let Android Users Spy On Each Other

https://gbhackers.com/facebook-messenger-bug/

Facebook Messenger establishes audio and video calls in WebRTC by exchanging a series of thrift messages in between the callee and caller. WebRTC is a free, open-source job that supplies web browsers and mobile applications with real-time interaction by means of basic application programming interfaces.

Shocked? So are we !! Lets have a look at how this can be re-created.

Tamagotchi hacker, Natalie Silvanovich, who works as a Security Engineer on Prjoect No at Google recently received a bounty of $60,000 for recognizing a bug in Facebook Messenger which enables a call to linked much before the callee has actually addressed the call. The bug appears to exist on the Android Facebook messenger app just.

Normally in an audio call, audio is sent just when the callee has participated in the call. There is an instance when the call transferring audio even before the recipient of the call can accept the call. This enables any miscreant to keep an eye on the victims environments.

1) Log into Facebook Messenger on the enemy device2) Log into Facebook Messenger on the target device. Log into Facebook in a browser on the very same account. (This will guarantee call set-up uses the delayed calls to setLocalDescription strategy, this PoC does not deal with the other strategy) 3) install frida on the assaulter gadget, and run Frida server4) make a call to any device with the assailant gadget to fill the RTC libraries so the can be hooked with Frida5) unzip sdp_update, and in your area in the folder, run:
python2 modifyout(.) py “attacker device name”
( to get a list of devices, run python2 modifyout(.) py.
6) make an audio call to the target device.
In a couple of seconds, audio from the target gadgets can be heard through the speakers of the assaulter device.
The PoC performs the following steps:.
1) Waits for the deal to be sent, and conserves the sdpThrift field from the offer2) Sends an SdpUpdate message with this sdpThift to the target3) Sends a phony SdpAnswer message to the * attacker * so the gadget believes the call has been responded to and plays the inbound audio.

In early 2019, Apples Facetime had a comparable bug whereby you might listen to the listen in on somebody, even if they have not selected the call.

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Usually in an audio call, audio is transmitted only when the callee has attended the call. There is an instance when the call sending audio even prior to the recipient of the call can accept the call. 1) Log into Facebook Messenger on the assaulter device2) Log into Facebook Messenger on the target device. Log into Facebook in a web browser on the exact same account. (This will guarantee call set-up utilizes the delayed calls to setLocalDescription method, this PoC doesnt work with the other method) 3) set up frida on the aggressor gadget, and run Frida server4) make a call to any gadget with the assaulter gadget to pack the RTC libraries so the can be hooked with Frida5) unzip sdp_update, and in your area in the folder, run: